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Nomts AND Co~m~Tzrs
rule does not necessarily prevent the trying of title to land m a suit
for money damages based on breach of contract, and there would seem
to be no reason why such a prevention would be desirable in the first
place. There does not appear to be any more danger of fraud between
the vendee and the one asserting the paramount claim in a situation m
which a default judgment can be obtained than in one in which there
may be a voluntary submission. If the basis for the rule is some feel-
ing upon the part of the court that a grantee should not be allowed
to disput his grantor s title, such a principle has no application where
covenants in a deed are involved, since such a dispute must always
occur before the covenants can be enforced or given effect. It is
therefore submitted that the Kentucky rule is undesirable because,
without sufficient reason, it requires an unnecessary multiplicity of
law suits.
Jms C. BLAIR
DIRECT RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION IN KENTUCKY
It has long been recognized that one of the incidents of owner-
ship of property is the right to convey it. Consequently, the law will
not permit this right of ownership to be unduly limited by the im-
position of restraints by grantors or testators who endeavor to dispose
of their property and at the same time maintain control over its aliena-
tion or use. The law seeks to encourage the ready alienation of prop-
erty and to discourage restraints upon alienation which would have
the effect of withdrawing such property from the ordinary channels
of trade and commerce. For these reasons, conditions operating as
restraints on alienation are usually held to be void as contrary to
public policy With some exceptions to be noted, this principle
applies to all interests in property, whether real or personal, legal or
equitable, and whether present or future. It applies to interests in
fee simple and to legal life estates.
The purpose of this note is to analyze the different types of direct
restraints on alienation, with special emphasis on Kentucky law, and
to determine the basis for the rules which the law has established in
its treatment of these restraints. It is not concerned with indirect
restraints on alienation which arise when an attempt is made to ac-
"Jones v. Caidwell, 176 Ky. 15, 195 S.W 122 (1917); see Burchett v. Black-
bume, 198 Ky. 304, 306, 248 S.W 853, 854 (1923) and cases cited thereto.
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complish some purpose other than the restraint of alienability Such
restraints arise on the creation of future interests and of trusts and
they ordinarily do not restrict the power of alienation but only the
fact of alienability
It is well to remember that the law is concerned primarily with
practical alienability The validity of a given provision depends upon
a number of circumstances, but, reduced to their lowest terms, these
considerations amount to no more than these two questions: First, to
what extent does the provision tend to decrease practical alienability;
second, what is the purpose of the restraint in question? It should be
noted that these two considerations are not weighed m each individual
case. The law is worked out for type situations and when a case falls
within one of these types, the rule is applied despite other circum-
stances affecting practical alienability in the particular case. In other
words, it is not a matter of practical alienability in a particular case,
but in a particular class of cases.
A direct restraint on alienation is a provision which by its terms
prohibits or penalizes the exercise of the power of alienation. Such a
provision is usually found m wills, deeds, contracts or similar instru-
ments. There may be a direction in the devise or conveyance that
the devisee or grantee shall not alienate, and this constitutes a disabling
restraint. Or the instrument may contain a condition to the effect that
any attempted alienation will result m a forfeiture of the estate such
being a forfeiture restraint. Finally, there may be a contract whereby
the grantee is bound to refrain from alienation, this being referred to
as a promissory restrait.
Disabling Restraints
In general, a disabling restraint is found where property is de-
vised or conveyed with a direction to the effect that it shall not be
alienated. Where such a provision is contained in an intrument, the
courts for the most part proceed on the assumption that if the direc-
tion is held valid, any attempt to alienate on the part of the transferee
will be void and since it is ineffective, it will have no bearing upon
the title. Furthermore, where such restraints are deemed valid, the
property cannot subsequently be alienated even though all parties
with interests therein so desire. As a result, the property is removed
from commerce completely For this reason, most courts hold nearly
all disabling restraints void.2
The terms disabling restraint, forfeiture restraint and promissory restraint are
the base of classification of restraints on alienation in the Amencan Law Institute
Restatement. See 4 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY sec. 404 (1944).
Sinms, FurruRE INTERESTS 838 (hornbook senes, 1951).
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Where the language m the instrument is in the form of a direction,
most courts given the provision a literal (disabling) interpretation.
In this respect Kentucky differs from the majority of states and m the
case of restraints on legal interests which are directions in form, the
courts have implied a condition subsequent m favor of the grantor or
his heirs, although no divesting provision or limitation is expressed.
For all practical purposes then, Kentucky construes what is m form
a disabling restraint to be a forfeiture restraint and m many cases
has held such restraints to be valid. In Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v
Keen,3 the court declared that where a direction in restraint of aliena-
tion is reasonable and no condition is expressed, a condition subse-
quent will be implied. Thus the conveyance by the grantee in
violation of the direction against alienation was held voidable and
not void after the breach had occurred. It should be emphasized
that the conveyance is voidable at the instance of the grantor and
therefore he has the power to re-enter and regain title to the land.
If all restraints of this kind were invalid there would be no problem.
But as will be shown below, since Kentucky upholds restraints of this
type which are reasonable in time the grantor must exercise his power
to avoid the conveyance during the time within which the alienation
was restrained; otherwise he will be deemed to have waived it.4
In most states nearly all disabling restraints are void, with two
exceptions-namely, restraints on the alienation of the beneficiary s
interest in a spendthrift trust and restraints on the alienation of sep-
arate estates in equity of married women. The first exception is the
important one today since the other is obsolete due to existing statutory
provisions giving a married woman a separate estate m property at
law Since most American courts recognize spendthrift trusts, some
consideration should be given to the question why such devices are
deemed valid as disabling restraints. In every spendthrift trust there
are two elements which tend to restrict alienability; the direct restraint
contained in the direction against alienation of the equitable interest,
and the indirect restraint resulting from the fact that a trust is pres-
ent. Any trust tends to impair practical alienability to some degree
since it is difficult to sell the beneficial interest even though the settlor
has not prohibited alienation of such interest. Hence the addition
of an express prohibition against the alienation of the beneficial inter-
est does not go much further m the direction of restraining alienability
'168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W 247 (1916); accord, Francis v. Big Sandy Co., 171
Ky. 209, 188 S.W 345 (1916); see Cooper v. Knuckles, 212 Ky. 608, 279 S.W
1084 (1926).
' Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, supra note 3.
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than the trust device itself. Certainly the extent of decrease of alien-
ability when the spendthrift provision is added is not nearly to great
as if a restraint were applied to a legal fee simple. This is one of the
primary reasons the spendthrift trust has been held valid as a dis-
abling restraint while the courts have refused to countenance other
such restraints. Spendthrift trusts have also been held valid on the
theory that the donor of property has the right to choose the object
of his bounty and the right to protect his gift from creditors of the
donee. That the protection of impecunious beneficiaries is in accord
with public policy, at least to the extent of keeping such beneficiaries
from becoming public charges is an additional factor sometimes
emphasized.-
Although Kentucky has held various disabling restraints on legal
interests valid, yet it is one of a minority of states which do not recog-
nize spendthrift trusts. The theories on which such trusts are rejected
have been said to be, first, that the right of alienation is a necessary
incident to an equitable estate for life, and, second, that it is contrary
to public policy that one should have the right to enjoy the income
of property to the exclusion of his creditors.6 A Kentucky Statute7
has been held to prevent the creditors of spendthrift trusts, at least
so far as the rights of creditors are concerned. This statute reads:
"Estates of every land held or possessed in trust are subject to the
debts and charges of the beneficiaries thereof the same as if the
beneficiaries also owned the similar legal interest in the property."
In Meade v Rowe s Executor and Trustees the court, in holding
void a spendthrift trust provision in a will, said: "One cannot devise
his property so that it will not be subject to the debts of the devisee
unless the devise contains a condition of cessor upon an attempted
alienation or the estate created is a mere use at the absolute and un-
controlled discretion of the trustee." Thus, in order to protect the
interest of a beneficiary in Kentucky, the settlor must provide an
absolute discretion in the trustee, 9 or a forfeiture on alienationO In
Canfield v. Security-First National Bank, 13 Cal. 2d 1, 87 P 2d 830 (1939);
Huestis v. Manley, 110 Vt. 413, 8 A. 2d 644 (1939).
6 Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 14 AUt. 497 (1888); see Sherman v. Havens,
94 Kan. 654, 146 Pac. 1030, 1031 (1915).
1Ky. REv. STAT. sec. 381.180 (1948).
8298 Ky. 111, 182 S.W 2d 30 (1944). For other cases interpreting the
statute: Lane v. Taylor, 287 Ky. 116, 152 S.W 2d 271 (1941); Todd's Exrs. v.
Todd, 260 Ky. 611, 86 S.W 2d 168 (1935); Keith v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.,
256 Ky. 88, 75 S.W 2d 747 (1934); Ford v. Ford, 230 Ky. 56, 18 S.W 2d 859(1929).
'Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Thompson, 172 Ky. 350, 189 S.V
245 (1916).
,' See, Keith v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 256 Ky. 88, 92; 75 S.W 2d, 747,
748 (1934).
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the first situation, the trustee may withhold any payments from the
beneficiary and thus the latter may not get anything. In the second
instance, the court construes the provision to be a condition subse-
quent rather than a restraint on alienation. A good example is a
provision in the trust instrument that the life estate or interest shall
go over to a third person upon the grantee s becoming bankrupt or
upon an attempt of his creditors to subject the estate or interest to
the payment of their claims. Kentucky holds such a provision valid."
In considering the question of forfeiture upon an involuntary aliena-
tion, it must be borne in mind that if there is no gift over to a third
person upon insolvency or attempt of creditor to reach the interest,
the condition is of no effect.12
It is submitted that those states which recognize spendthrift trusts
proceed on the theory that the settlor s intent and the practicability
of giving effect to such intent outweigh the factors that such trusts
curtail alienability and work a hardship on creditors, whereas those
states rejecting such trusts give the rights of the creditor preference
over the intent of the settlor. Since the argument that such trusts
curb alienability is weakened by the fact that the trust itself tends to
remove the interest from commerce, apparently the problem is whether
public policy should swing the judicial pendulum in favor of the
settlor s intent or should instead recognize the creditor s rights. Most
states believe that the advantages resulting from the enforcement of
spendthrift trust provisions outweigh the advantages of free alien-
ability
Forfeiture Restraints
A forfeiture restraint exists where the creating instrument contains
a condition, a special limitation, or an executory limitation by which
the estate of the grantor may be divested or terminated on alienation.
A majority of jurisdictions hold such restraints on estates greater
than life estates void, and take the view that the grantee has an
absolute interest in the property 13 Here, however, there is a some-
what stronger minority view than in the case of disabling restraints,
probably because a forfeiture restraint does not cut down on the
transferability of land to the same degree as does a disabling restraint.
Where forfeiture restraints are held valid, and the grantee breaches
the restraint, such breach divests title from him and thenceforth the
land is alienable. Such a break in no way affects the grantee s title
"Bull v. Kentucky National Bank, 90 Ky. 452, 14 S.W 425 (1890).
-Brock v. Brock, 168 Ky. 847, 183 S.W 213 (1916).
"SiuFs, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 344.
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where a disabling restraint is involved. Kentucky adheres to the
minority rule and recognizes forfeiture restraints. In addition Ken-
tucky fails to discriminate between disabling and forfeiture restraints
and implies a condition subsequent where the language is that of a
direction,14 which in effect establishes a single category
In the states recogmzmg the type of restraint under consideration,
where the title goes upon a breach by the grantee depends upon the
nature of the restraint. If it is an executory limitation, the title passes
to the party with the executory interest named in the instrument; if
it is a special limitation, the title passes to the grantor; and if it is a
condition subsequent, the grantor, should he elect to take advantage
of the forfeiture, may enter and reacquire title. In the latter case,
the title is in the grantee s transferee until the grantor elects to take
advantage of the forfeiture, since the conveyance is merely voidable
and not void.
Kentucky is one of the few states which recognizes restraints on
the alienation of legal interests. Only restraints against voluntary
alienation are permitted,15 and they are in no way effective to limit
the rights of creditors. 16 These restraints against the voluntary alien-
ation of legal interests are valid only if they are reasonable restraints.
When we come to mquire what constitutes a reasonable restraint
within the Kentucky rule, the answer is not easy Although Kentucky
has a statute17 which purports on its face to prohibit the suspension
of the power of alienation for a longer period than during the con-
tinuance of lives in being at the creation of the estate and twenty-one
years thereafter, Cammack v Allen' held that the statute is merely
declaratory of the common law rule against perpetuities and has no
bearing on restraints on alienation. Although the case of Perry v
Metcalfe'9 later rejected the conclusion reached in the Cammack case,
the recent case of Gray v Gray20 is in accord with Cammack v Allen.
In the Gray case the court said: "Sometimes there is confusion or a
failure to regard as distinct laws the rule against perpetuities, which
is principally covered by [this] statute and the rule against
unreasonable restraints on the power of alienation, which is common
law The statute applies only to the suspension of the ultimate vest-
ing of an estate and not to any restraint upon the right or power of
'Kentland Coal & Coke Co. v. Keen, 168 Ky. 836, 183 S.W 247 (1916).
'Wallace v. Smith, 118 Ky. 268, 68 S.W 131 (1902).
16Brock v. Brock, 168 Ky. 847, 183 S.W 213 (i916).
Ky. REv. STAT. see. 381.220 (1948).
199 Ky. 268, 250 S.W 963 (1923).
"216 Ky. 755, 288 S.W 694 (1926).
-8300 Ky. 265, 188 S.W 2d 440 (1945).
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alienation of an estate already vested, or which is or but for the re-
straint would be indefeasible."2 1
As said in Lawson v Lzghtfoot,*-2 the court has never fixed a limit
to a restraint, but what restraints are reasonable and what are un-
reasonable must be determined upon the particular circumstances of
each case as it comes before the court. A provision that the grantee
should not trade or sell the property for twenty years except to the
grantor s bodily heirs was sustained by the court m Francis v Big
Sandy Co.2 3 A proviso that land should not be sold until twenty
years had elapsed after the testator s death was held good in Johnson
v Duneyer,24 and one to the effect that the devisee should not alien-
ate until he arrived at the age of twenty-eight years was sustained
in Kean s Guardian v Kean.2 5 Several cases have held that such a
provision forbidding alienation before reaching the age of thirty-five
was valid.2 6 However, where the limitation is for the lifetime of the
grantee or devisee, the decisions are numerous that hold such a limi-
taion is inconsistent with the estate conveyed and is void.27  On the
other hand, it is clear that the Kentucky Court of Appeals will sus-
tain a restriction on alienation for the lifetime of the grantor or some
other person than the grantee or devisee. 2s The court, in Saulsberry
v Saulsberry,20 ruled that a provision in a deed of 1896 stipulating
that the land should not be alienated before 1950 was invalid.
The "reasonableness" test as applied m- Kentucky may appear to
be sound, but from a practical viewpoint it is not satisfactory because
it results in an increase of litigation since it is difficult to ascertain
what titles are secure and what limitations are valid without a law
suit. Restraints against voluntary alienation are doubtless valid when
applied to equitable interests 0 since the right of creditors would in
no way be affected. As in the case of spendthrift trusts, Kentucky
protects the creditor in refusing to recognize any involuntary re-
stramts on legal interets, reasonable or otherwise.
Gray v. Gray, supra note 20, at 269, 188 S.W 2d at 448.
=27 Ky. L. Rep. 217, 84 S.W 789 (1905).
'171 Ky. 209, 188 S.W 845 (1916).
2 Ky. L. Rep. 2248, 66 S.W 1025 (1902).
18 Ky. L. Rep. 956, 18 S.W 1082 (1892).
'Smith v. Isaacs, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1727, 78 S.W 484 (1904); Wallace v.
Smith, 118 Ky. 268, 68 S.W 181 (1902).
' Thurmond v. Thurmond, 190 Ky. 582, 228 S.W 29 (1921); Cropper v.
Bowvles, 150 Ky. 893, 150 S.W 880 (1912).
-Turner v. Lewis, 189 Ky. 887, 226 S.W 867 (1920); Polley v. Adlans, 145
Ky. 870, 140 S.W 551 (1911).
z'140 Ky. 608, 181 S.W 491 (1910).
=See Muirs Exrs. v. Howard, 178 Ky. 51, 198 S.W 551 (1917).
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Promissory Restraints
A promissory restraint is found in those situations where there is
an agreement not to alienate, either in the form of a covenant in a
conveyance or lease, or a contract with respect to the sale of an
interest in land. The validity of such restraints is important m de-
termining whether such agreements will be specifically enforced. In
most jurisdictions, the validity of promissory restraints on real prop-
erty is determined in the same way as is the validity of analagous
forfeiture restraints.31 As in the case of a forfeiture restraint, a
promissory restraint may be dispensed with if all the parties con-
cerned agree to do so. In this respect these two types differ from
the disabling restraint under which property cannot thereafter be
alienated even though all the parties so desire. This apparently is
the reason why promissory restraints are treated similarly to for-
feiture restraints, despite the fact that they more closely resemble
disabling restraints in form.
In last analysis, a given rule on alienation is a result of balancing
the beneficial character of the purposes of the restraint as against the
extent to which alienability would be hindered, if the provision in
question were held valid. While courts seldom have much to say
about purpose, it is a most important factor in determining the char-
acter of the rule. One may well anticipate that, in thq face of new
purposes which are definitely in accord with good public policy, the
courts may make new exceptions to the old doctrines with respect to
direct restraints.
CHAmRLs R. GROMLEY
REMEDIES OF GOOD FAITH OCCUPIER WHO HAS
IMPROVED LAND - IN KENTUCKY
Courts have long been faced with the problem of providing an
adequate remedy for the good faith purchaser of land who makes
valuable improvements thereon, and is later ejected from the land
because of a superior title in a third person. The purchaser, usually
called an "occupying claimant", cannot recover the improvements
themselves where they have become a part of the realty, but since
he has expended a sum of money and enhanced the value of another s
property because of an honest mistake, the law should afford hin
' Snibs, op. cit. supra, note 1, at 355.
